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Abstract. This essay takes President John F. Kennedy’s visionary ‘Declaration of 
Interdependence’ of 1962, in which he called for a concrete transatlantic partnership on equal 
footing as the benchmark to assess today’s relationship between the USA and the European 
Union in defence matters. The central question is: can the European Union with its emerging 
security and defence policy be seen as one of the two supporting pillars of NATO next to the 
USA? To this end, the general security strategies, the institutional frameworks and capabilities, 
as well as the defence industries of both sides are compared. The result is that, although the 
strategies and initiatives taken by the EU point towards a more equitable partnership, the 
current state of capabilities and defence industries make it impossible to conclude that NATO 
rests on two equal pillars. Nevertheless, in view of the history of European integration and in 
anticipation of the fresh impetus to be given by the Obama administration, the author closes by 
suggesting a less static image of the transatlantic partnership, namely that of an ever-changing, 
yet ever-closer partnership.
I Introduction: The Declaration of Interdependence: A Visionary 
Statement
On the 4 July 1962, President John F. Kennedy gave an address at the 
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, which would enter into history as the 
‘Declaration of Interdependence’.1 An important part of this speech was 
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devoted to the president’s ‘visionary’2 approach to the further development 
of the USA’s relationship with Europe. Kennedy was very favourable towards 
the project of European integration, which according to him the USA should 
regard ‘with hope and admiration’ and not consider ‘as a rival but as a partner’.3 
He added that even though ‘[b]uilding the transatlantic partnership now will 
not be easily or cheaply finished’, the USA was ‘prepared to discuss with a 
united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, 
a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in 
Europe and the old American Union’.4 Furthermore, and very importantly, this 
partnership ought to be ‘on a basis of full equality’.5
This was due to the realization that even the USA, in spite of its superpower 
status, could not ‘establish justice throughout the world’ while acting alone, 
nor guarantee its ‘domestic tranquility, or provide for its common defense’.6 
Therefore, this new ‘Atlantic partnership . . . would not look inward only, 
preoccupied with its own welfare and advancement . . . It would serve as a 
nucleus for the eventual union of all free men – those who are now free and 
those who are vowing that some day they will be free.’7
Although Kennedy mentioned a whole range of policy areas in which both 
sides of the Atlantic should cooperate, including development aid, trade and 
monetary issues, this paper will focus on what Kennedy called ‘the common 
defense’, the embodiment of which has been the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) for no fewer than six decades since its foundation 
in 1949. This is the field where calls for a more equitable and balanced 
transatlantic partnership have been most strongly reiterated ever since. Yet, 
this is also the area where such a balance seems to be most difficult to achieve, 
both in the past and today. 
For the purpose of this paper, the current state of the transatlantic partnership 
in defence matters will be reappraised, taking President Kennedy’s design as 
the benchmark. Therefore, it will be broken down into two core characteristics: 
partnership and equality. The former means that the two sides have a common 
set of goals and interests and recognize the need to collaborate in order to fulfil 
and protect these. The latter is a more specific quality of this relation, namely 
that both sides have the same weight in deciding which direction the joint 
enterprise should take and that they share the same burden. This was captured 
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in the image of the Alliance resting on ‘two pillars’, i.e. North America and 
Europe, and at the core of these, the USA and what is now the European 
Union. This image, although attributed to Kennedy, was not mentioned in 
the speech but has subsequently become a symbol for what he meant by ‘full 
equality’.8
To this end, the existence of these two characteristics will be analysed 
on three levels following a top-down approach. The first will be the general 
security policies of the USA and the EU as represented by their respective 
strategy papers. The second level will deal with their respective capabilities 
needed to live up to what is envisaged in their strategies. The third level 
finally will assess their respective defence industries in order to determine 
their ability to actually procure such capabilities, before drawing a conclusion 
with regard to the USA–EU relationship within NATO.
Before starting this exercise, however, it should be pointed out that there 
are opinions of and approaches to the transatlantic relationship that differ 
from Kennedy’s vision to varying degrees, ranging from favouring a more 
unequal relationship and a division of labour,9 or on the contrary an adversarial 
counterbalancing by Europe vis-à-vis the USA,10 to even evoking the inevitable 
drifting apart of Europe and the USA due to irreconcilable perceptions of the 
world.11 Also, it must be stressed that not all EU Member States are members 
of NATO and that the two-pillars image tends to eclipse other important NATO 
members such as Canada, Norway or Turkey and their contributions to the 
Alliance. Nevertheless, for reasons of being concise and in order to properly 
appreciate the appeal that Kennedy’s vision still has in today’s literature and 
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political discourse, this paper will limit itself to assessing what has become of 
this vision and not embark on discussing these related issues. 
II Partnership and Equality in the Transatlantic Relationship Today
At first glance, it is stunning that an approach so enthusiastically heralded in 
public has had hardly any practical impact for decades. However, a look at the 
strategic situation during most of this time gives several ‘quite understandable 
reasons’.12 This can best be explained by the strategic situation during the 
cold war, where there was no ‘choice but to share the same strategic goal 
and methods, in the face of a single and existential threat’.13 However, both 
sides of the Atlantic were exposed to it to very different degrees. Whereas the 
Western Europeans were concerned with the ‘immediate regional threat’14 of 
being overrun in a ‘massive attack’15 by the Soviets and their allies, the USA 
was concerned with a global attempt to contain communism and maintain 
overall nuclear deterrence.16
Through calls for reinforced burden-sharing, the USA rather intended to 
be offset and thus to be given more leeway and resources in other parts of the 
world, than to develop a more equitable partnership.17 This was also reflected 
in their respective capabilities, as for ‘most Western European countries, this 
required the development of heavy armies built around armour, artillery and 
short-range air superiority fighters . . . For the USA, by contrast, preparing for 
a major battle in Europe required precisely the capacities most of its European 
Allies did not need: mobility, sustainability, the capacity to project and sustain 
forces over distance and time.’18 Although it would be an exaggeration to 
say that this strategic situation degraded the Europeans to ‘footsloggers’,19 
furnishing ‘the bulk of conventional power’,20 the very image of this sword–
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shield strategy clearly illustrates that this was not a partnership on equal 
footing, but a very obvious division of labour.21
Moreover, it could even be argued that there was no need for a more 
independent Europe in this respect: neither for the USA, as NATO was for 
them ‘the most efficient forum to exercise American leadership’,22 nor for 
the Europeans, since ‘the only salvation rested with NATO, the presence of 
American forces on the old continent, and the strategy of deterrence based 
on U.S. nuclear forces’.23 Moreover, endeavours for autonomous capacities 
might have weakened American commitment24 in Europe, the preservation of 
which was the prime aspiration of most European states.
This situation did not change overnight with the end of the cold war. Both 
NATO and the European states had to redefine their respective future security 
policies. In 1999, the Alliance updated its strategic concept, recognizing that 
‘[t]he dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also 
challenging, prospects, to new opportunities and risks’25 and acknowledging 
that a ‘new Europe of greater integration is emerging’.26 Therefore, in order 
to address these ‘current and future security challenges’,27 NATO vowed to 
‘maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure 
a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility’,28 
wording that harked back strongly to Kennedy’s speech. As far as the Europeans 
were concerned, drawing up a common security and defence policy of their 
own was a very delicate matter, with defence – touching as it does on issues 
of sovereignty – being a highly sensitive area. At the same time, NATO, an 
organization that was deprived of its original raison d’être and whose demise 
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was predicted by many,29 embarked on transforming itself to adapt to the new 
situation. Nevertheless, this readjustment took over a decade and was not free 
from difficult external and internal crises. But eventually neither managed to 
break it, nor even to prevent its enlargement.30
Now, in 2009, the time seems ripe for the reappraisal of Kennedy’s vision, 
and this for several reasons: 16 years have passed since the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European Union and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, nine years have passed since the 
European Council of Cologne launched the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), and finally NATO itself is celebrating its 60th anniversary, 
while Barack Obama, having emerged victorious from the presidential election 
with an oft-repeated promise of change, takes office in Washington D.C. 
By this time, not only has the EU concretized the ESDP by virtue of its 
European Security Strategy,31 it has also fostered its implementation by setting 
up institutional frameworks for the improvement of its military capabilities and 
by underpinning these with more efficient procurement mechanisms through 
the European Defence Agency (EDA). Moreover, in a relatively short period 
of time, it has already conducted a number of missions by itself, both of a civil 
and military character, spanning from the Balkans to the Congo, and from the 
Caucasus to the Horn of Africa and even as far as Indonesia.32 The least that 
can be said is that this advancing European Union definitely possesses more 
potential than at any time in the past of becoming the second supporting pillar 
in the transatlantic partnership.
1. Strategy and General Policy
It is worth examining the extent to which the security strategies of the USA 
and the EU reflect the spirit of Kennedy’s design for the Alliance, for it is a 
minimum requirement that the two sides recognize each other as important 
and equal partners on paper. For this purpose, the already mentioned European 
Security Strategy of 2003 and its US counterpart, the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 (in its updated version of 2006)33 will be analysed. 
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In general, it can be observed that the fundamental goals, the assessment 
of threats, as well as the options envisaged to respond to these are essentially 
the same in both documents. In other words: ‘In broad terms . . . [they] share 
a similar vision of a “better world”’.34 The main differences exist due to the 
fact that the USA still sees itself as being ‘at war’35 with terrorism, whereas 
the EU tends to place this phenomenon in a wider, less martial context. 
The consequence of this is that the US strategy stresses the necessity of 
‘preemption’,36 i.e. military strikes before an actual attack is bound to occur. 
Whether this part of the strategy will be taken over by the new administration 
is doubtful as President Obama stressed that ‘power grows through its prudent 
use’ and that ‘security emanates . . . from the tempering qualities of humility 
and restraint’.37 Still, the fact remains that Obama continues to see his country 
as being ‘at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred’.38
The EU, for its part, wholeheartedly promotes what it calls ‘preventive 
engagement’,39 i.e. a comprehensive approach aimed at solving the root 
problems of extremism, namely poverty and underdevelopment. All the same, 
the EU also puts ‘terrorism’ at the top of its list of key threats.40
Turning to the perceptions of their respective partner across the Atlantic, 
the EU is more than clear. Firstly, it acknowledges that ‘[t]he United States 
has played a critical role in European integration and European security, 
in particular through NATO’.41 Later, it stresses that ‘[t]he transatlantic 
relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the 
USA can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an 
effective and balanced partnership with the USA.’42 Furthermore, it underlines 
the importance of NATO, which, in its view, is ‘an important expression of 
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 38 Obama, note 37 above.
 39 European Security Strategy, note 31 above, p. 11.
 40 Ibid., p. 3. 
 41 Ibid., p. 1.
 42 Ibid., p. 13. 
this relationship’.43 It also states that although the USA is today’s dominant 
military power, ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems 
on its own’.44 The EU has re-emphasized its stance in its Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy of December 2008.45 In 
sum, the resemblance to Kennedy’s 1962 vision is remarkable both in terms 
of partnership and equality. 
The US strategy, for its part, also readily stresses that ‘Europe is home to 
some of our oldest and closest allies’ and that ‘[o]ur cooperative relations 
are built on a sure foundation of shared values and interests’.46 Therefore, 
‘[t]he North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a vital pillar of U.S. foreign 
policy’.47 It is interesting to note that the USA also seems to regard the EU 
as a unitary entity in its strategy.48 This has, at least as a first step, been re-
emphasized by President G.W. Bush’s visit to the EU institutions in spring 
2005, where both sides again underscored that the transatlantic partnership was 
‘irreplaceable and vital’ and that ‘a strong and united Europe will strengthen 
this strategic partnership between the European Union and the United States’.49 
However, notwithstanding this general sense of partnership, the impression 
prevails that the USA is to be at the head of this common undertaking. In 
the words of the National Security Strategy: ‘[T]he United States seeks to 
extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end 
tyranny and to promote effective democracy.’50 This interest in bolstering the 
EU, as well as the American claim for leadership, both appear likely to be 
continued by the Obama administration: whereas Barack Obama, still as a 
presidential candidate, announced in his speech in Berlin that ‘America has 
no better partner than Europe’ and that the Americans ‘need a strong European 
296 LARIK
 43 European Security Strategy, note 31 above, p. 9; see also pp. 8 and 12 in this regard. 
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This is how we plan to lead, and this is the legacy we will leave to those who follow’ (p. 49) 
(all emphases added). 
Union’,51 he underscored half a year later in his inaugural address as president 
that it was the USA that was ‘ready to lead once more’.52
In conclusion, it can be stated that on the one hand, in terms of strategy and 
general attitude, the EU today fully embodies the ‘spirit’ of which President 
Kennedy spoke back in 1962. On the other hand, by claiming an undisputed 
leading role among its partners in the world, the US views Europe, albeit as a 
crucial ally, rather as a primus inter inferiores than as what President Kennedy 
called ‘a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality’.
2. Structures and Capabilities
Moving down from the high and at times lofty politics of general guidelines 
and designs to the level of actual institutional structures and operational 
capabilities, the extent to which the two sides are capable of living up to their 
aspirations and of effectively sharing the common burden can be assessed. 
First, it has to be stated that much has been achieved in recent years to 
make use of synergies and to close the infamous capabilities gap between the 
military forces of the USA and the EU thanks to NATO. On the institutional 
level, the eventual implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements in 2003, 
through which the EU is entitled to avail itself of NATO assets and capabilities, 
can be seen as a milestone in the interlocking of the ESDP with NATO and in 
paving the way for genuine EU operations.53 Furthermore, this is underpinned 
by regular meetings between NATO and EU officials, e.g. most prominently 
between the North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security 
Committee, and the creation of an EU cell at SHAPE, NATO’s headquarters 
in Europe.54 Also, as the European Council concluded last December, ‘[t]he 
EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and 
in Afghanistan’,55 a success that has to be largely attributed to this new inter-
institutional set-up. 
This appears thus to be a viable approach in order to both enable the EU 
to carry out operations by itself, as stipulated at the European Council in 
Laeken 2001, and at the same time to reassure the USA that this will entail ‘no 
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decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination’56 of NATO and of the American 
contributions to it. Moreover, this also led the Gaullist camp within the EU 
to finally abandon its plans of setting up military structures independent from 
NATO, which had been formulated in Tervuren in April 2003. To the contrary, 
France under President Sarkozy has recently announced that it will rejoin 
NATO’s integrated military structure after having left it no fewer than 43 
years ago. Vice-President Biden already affirmed that ‘the United States, like 
other Allies, would warmly welcome’ such a decision, expecting that this 
would also ‘strengthen the European role within the Alliance’.57
Thus, from an institutional point of view, the trend is definitely towards 
closer cooperation between the USA and the EU through NATO structures. 
Accepting the setting-up of proper EU structures within – or at least not in 
opposition to – the transatlantic framework indicates that the USA has come 
to terms with the further development of the EU as a reinforced and more 
homogenous component of the Alliance. Notwithstanding, it is yet too early 
to qualify this as a ‘basis of full equality’.
Apart from the institutions as such, it has been frequently stressed that 
‘what matters’58 in the area of defence is actual capabilities.59 Here it is more 
than obvious that the USA and the EU are anything but equal. To illustrate 
this, a look at the respective defence expenditures in 2005 reveals that all EU 
Member States combined spent around 40 per cent of the amount the USA 
spent.60 Despite the rising number of ESDP missions, this situation has not 
changed and leaves EU defence ministers complaining that the USA still has 
‘more than double’ in terms of budget.61 However, more striking is in fact not 
the amount of money spent, but rather what the EU spends it on, namely ‘to 
fund 25 armies, 21 air forces and 18 navies’.62 What is more, ‘the imbalance is 
especially acute in spending on research, technology and development [where] 
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 57 Biden, note 37 above.
 58 C. Grant, ‘Reviving European Defence Cooperation’ (2003) 51/4 NATO Rev., <www.
nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art2_pr.html>.
 59 See C. Bennett, (‘Foreword’ (2002) 50/3 NATO Rev., <www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/
issue3/english/foreword.html>): ‘When Lord Robertson became NATO Secretary General he 
said that he had three priorities: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.’
 60 See G. Lindstorm, ‘EU–US Burden Sharing: Who Does What?’ Chaillot Paper, No. 82, 
EUISS, Paris, 2005, at p. 89 (Table 32).
 61 European Defence Agency, A Strategy For the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base, Brussels, 14 May 2007, p. 3, <www.eda.europa.eu>.
 62 Howorth, note 32 above, at p. 117. To these, the armed forces of Romania and Bulgaria 
would have to be added today. 
the ratio is currently some 6 to 1’63 between the USA and the EU, which is 
experiencing a rapid revolution in military affairs.64
While remaining reluctant to increase spending, the EU has launched 
initiatives aiming at making European capabilities more efficient, like the 
Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), the European Capabilities Action Plan (2001) 
and finally the Headline Goal 2010 (2006). However, progress in this respect 
has been rather slow and significant deficits remain until today.65 Since NATO 
itself is also concerned with the enhancement of European capabilities, it has 
made efforts alongside the European Union, like the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative of 1999, later readapted at the Prague Summit of 2002 in order 
to ‘strengthen the European pillar in NATO’.66 An interesting feature of this 
is the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is now fully operational. The 
NRF is not only providing the Alliance with a technologically advanced, 
highly ready force, but also has the formidable advantage that owing to its 
rotation principle among the participating forces, it serves as a catalyst for 
modernization by using NATO (i.e. above all US) military infrastructure.67 
Therefore, it enables continuing improvement of European capabilities while 
maintaining the ability to work together with US forces, i.e. guaranteeing 
interoperability, and thus avoiding decoupling.68
Nonetheless, the slight differences in the analysis of threats and responses 
as outlined in the preceding section also account to a certain extent for the 
differences in the current force structures. It has been stressed that while 
Europeans will be dependent on the USA for high-intensity operations, they 
may be better trained and equipped for peacekeeping, post-conflict and 
stabilization missions. This is especially due to the fact that the EU has built 
sophisticated civil–military capacities including police forces, civil protection 
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 63 European Defence Agency, note 61 above, p. 3.
 64 For a comprehensive analysis of this development see A. Erger, Futurismus im Pentagon: 
Neue Kriegsformen - Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (2005, Braumüller, Vienna).
 65 Council of the European Union, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, Brussels, 
11 December 2008, pp. 3–4, <www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/
en/esdp/104676.pdf>; also European Council, note 45 above, p. 10; see also in greater detail 
Council of the European Union, Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006, <www.consilium.
europa.eu>.
 66 NATO, ‘Defence Capabilities Initiative’, press release NAC-S(99)69, 25 April 1999, 
<www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>.
 67 I. Garnett, ‘NATO Response Force’ (2003) 148/6 The Royal United Services Institute 
Journal, pp. 20–25 at p. 23.
 68 For a more detailed discussion of the NRF see N. Eitelhuber, ‘Die NATO Response 
Force. Ihre Bedeutung für Europa’ (2002) 52 SWP-Aktuell; and B. Renne, ‘Die Europäische 
Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit: Probleme und 
Perspektiven der EU-Eingreiftruppe unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Verhältnisses 
zur NATO-Response Force’ (2004) 134 Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und 
Sicherheitspolitik.
units in case of disaster and significant numbers of experts in the fields of 
rule of law and public administration.69 Although on a less drastic scale, there 
is a point in contrasting the hard power gap in favour of the USA with a soft 
power gap in favour of the Europeans, since the USA has only recently begun 
to develop such capabilities.70
This divergence, however, if not straightened out, poses the danger of a 
permanent ‘division of labour, whereby the high-tech allies (principally the 
USA) provide the logistics, strategic air- and sealift, intelligence and air power, 
and the others, by default, find themselves increasingly responsible for the 
manpower-intensive tasks such as long-term peacekeeping’,71 which is prone 
to become ‘politically unsustainable’,72 put ‘enormous strain on NATO’s unity 
and cohesion’,73 and would become increasingly a twenty-first century version 
of the cold war division of labour mentioned above. Therefore, and instead of 
fully catching up to the Americans in the revolution of military affairs (which 
has turned out not to be a panacea for providing security either), it seems more 
expedient for both to meet in the middle.
To sum up, a drifting apart of the structures used by the USA and the EU 
has been prevented through institutionally interlocking the ESDP with NATO, 
thus preserving partnership. However, especially when looking at the actual 
capabilities, there is an apparent lack of equality. Whether the EU – and to a 
lesser extent the USA – will be able to close this gap remains to be seen. Here 
Kennedy’s prediction that ‘[b]uilding the Atlantic partnership now will not be 
easily or cheaply finished’ holds most true. 
3. Defence Industries
Moving down to the last point of discussion, the question has to be asked how 
the EU intends to acquire the hardware for these new capabilities referred to in 
the preceding section. Drawing up declarations and charts with large numbers 
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 69 Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, note 65 above, pp. 2–3; see also 
Council of the European Union, Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference 2006, 
Ministerial Declaration, Brussels, 13 November 2006, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
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 70 See V. Heise, Die ESVP in transatlantischer Perspektive. Mehr Unterschiede als 
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 71 Appathurai, note 13 above.
 72 Ibid.
 73 Ibid.
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of high-end forces on ministerial conferences is one thing, but being able to 
actually produce the materials needed for such units is far more complicated. 
Without an adequate and effective industrial and technological basis, these 
aspirations will not be realizable. Therefore, it is indispensable to take into 
account the conditions of the defence industry of the EU, also in comparison 
to the USA.
The first observation to be made here is that one cannot even speak of 
a single European defence industry. Rather, the EU is fragmented into 27 
national industries that vary remarkably in size. Furthermore, except for dual-
use goods, trade in defence equipment is virtually excluded from the Internal 
Market through an excessive recourse to Article 296 of the EC Treaty, thus 
inhibiting the free circulation of these goods within the EU, complicating 
joint procurement programs and thus, as the European Commission itself put 
it, ‘effectively assimilating Member States to third countries’.74 This is both 
an ineffective and highly costly situation.75
A number of initiatives to improve this have been taken, most prominently 
by setting up the European Defence Agency and by adopting the legally 
non-binding European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998) as 
well as the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EU Member 
States Participating in the European Defence Agency and the Code of Best 
Practice in the Supply Chain (2005). However, it remains unclear whether 
these efforts will eventually lead to a truly common market for armaments. 
Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (who is also head of the EDA) harshly criticized the current 
situation in early 2007, reminding EU Member States that ‘[n]o one should 
remain under the illusion that a healthy and comprehensive DTIB [defence 
technology industrial base] can be sustained on a national basis’76 and calling 
for ‘radical changes’.77 Whether this verbal pressure will suffice to bring 
about these necessary changes remains yet to be seen. By the end of 2008, the 
EU Council at least acknowledged that ‘[a] robust and competitive European 
 74 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-
related products within the Community, COM (2007) 765 final, 5 December 2007, at p. 3. 
 75 According to a study for the European Commission, market fragmentation alone produces 
annual costs of around EUR3.16 billion per year; P.-E. Schmitz and M. Flammang, ‘Analysis of 
the impact of a proposal for intra-Community transfers of defence products: Impact Assessment’, 
final report of the study ‘Analysis of the impact of a proposal for intra-Community transfers 
of Defence products’, carried out by Unisys for the European Commission, Brussels, February 
2007, p. 42. 
 76 J. Solana, keynote speech, EDA Conference on the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base, S040/07, Brussels, 1 February 2007, available at <www.eda.europa.eu>, p. 2. 
 77 Ibid., p. 1. 
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defence technological base . . . is both a strategic and an economic necessity 
for the EU’,78 and pledged to reinforce its efforts to that end.
 By contrast, the US defence industry is not only organized in a single 
market and dealing with one main procurement agency, namely the Pentagon, 
but also has – and with remarkable speed – consolidated into a limited number 
of large corporations, the so-called ‘system integrators’. Of these, the EU has 
only EADS to offer, which is marked by recurring crises among its different 
national shareholders.79 This is certainly the aspect in transatlantic relations 
where one could speak least of equal footing.
Moreover, so far there has been hardly any cooperation in this respect across 
the Atlantic (apart from simply purchasing US products), with MEADS (the 
Medium Extended Air Defence System) being a rare exception.80 Whereas 
Europe’s defence industry is characterized by its heterogeneity, so is that of 
the USA by its foreclosure against the outside world. Foreign companies have 
almost no access to the American market, and there have hardly been any 
mergers of corporations across the Atlantic. Therefore, the term ‘Fortress 
America’81 in this respect is quite appropriate. As the EU defence ministers, 
meeting as the EDA steering board, put it in May 2007, they continue to 
see ‘the problem of accessing the US defence market, and of establishing 
balanced technology exchanges across the Atlantic’.82 In turn, this required 
them ‘to cooperate more closely to ensure the future of their own’83 defence 
technological and industrial base.
In the end, it remains true that if such a ‘“fortress America” persists, 
and if Europe develops a common armaments policy “in opposition” to the 
USA, there is a risk of confrontation between two closed systems, with 
damaging consequences for relations within industry in particular, but also 
for transatlantic relations in general’.84 Conversely, apart from economic and 
technological advantages, enhanced cooperation of the defence industries 
across the Atlantic would also have a beneficial linking effect for the Alliance 
 78 Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, note 65 above, p. 5.
 79 For an overview see B. Blumenau, F. Groba, J. Larik and D. Rosen, ‘Deutschland und 
die europäische Rüstungskooperation: Perspektiven für einen hochsensiblen Politikbereich’ in 
A. Niemann and A. Brand (eds), Interessen und Handlungsspielräume in der deutschen und 
europäischen Außenpolitik (TUD-Press, Dresden, 2007), pp. 215–239 at pp. 230–234; also 
C. Grams, ‘Transatlantische Rüstungskooperation: Wandel und Bedeutung’ (2003) 10 Kieler 
Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, pp. 5–13.
 80 See J. Rohde and A. James, ‘The Future of Transatlantic Armaments Co-operation’, 
working paper for the Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, July 2004, p. 9. 
 81 B. Schmitt, ‘Fortress America in a changing transatlantic defence market’ in idem (ed.), 
‘Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defence Market’, Chaillot Paper, 
No. 44, EUISS, Paris, 2001, pp. 3–49.
 82 European Defence Agency, note 61 above, p. 2.
 83 Ibid.
 84 B. Schmitt, ‘Introduction’ in Chaillot Paper, No. 44, note 84 above, pp. 1–2 at p. 1.
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as such. It is thus apparent that most remains to be done in this respect, both 
in terms of equality and partnership.
IV Concluding Remarks: An Ever-changing, Yet Ever-closer 
Partnership?
After having analysed the different levels of the contemporary USA–EU 
relationship within NATO, a conclusion will now be drawn as to whether there 
is today, in the year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, such a ‘concrete Atlantic 
Partnership’ in matters of defence as Kennedy envisaged back in 1962. 
First, it can well be stated that history confirmed Kennedy’s prediction that 
such a ‘great new edifice is not built overnight’. Following the end of the cold 
war, it took the Europeans over a decade to devise a framework of what an 
integrated European pillar in the Alliance could look like.
In terms of common values, interests and ways to protect these, a common 
understanding and a strong sense of partnership are evident across the Atlantic, 
in spite of all the crises the Alliance has endured in recent times. Although 
a claim of leadership persists on part of the USA, this does not necessarily 
exclude a prospective partnership in leadership with Europe, to borrow an 
expression from another former US president, George Bush sr.85 This in turn 
leads to the question of institutions and capabilities, which would be the 
indispensable underpinning of such a relationship on an equal footing. Here 
it can be observed that the cooperation between the EU and the USA through 
NATO has been consolidated by a number of institutional links. However, 
it remains yet to be seen how this will affect their respective stakes in the 
Alliance. A look at the capabilities now in place reveals that by no means 
can one can speak of equality and true burden-sharing. Whereas the EU now 
possesses some key capabilities in the civil–military area, where it is thus by 
way of an exception ahead of the USA, in general it continues to lag far behind. 
When eventually looking at armaments cooperation as a means of closing the 
gap, it has to be noted that there is neither anything close to equality, nor 
seems there to be a real sense of partnership to start with.
As a bottom line, one could say that the farther one moves away from what 
is envisaged on paper towards the circumstances in reality, the more remote 
a tangible, strong European pillar becomes. Then again, it has to be conceded 
that on all these levels, initiatives have been taken and it will be worthwhile to 
keep these processes under constant scrutiny. This was also the gist of the last 
NATO summit that took place in Bucharest in April 2008. In its final declaration 
 85 This concept originally described the new relationship envisaged between the USA and 
the Federal Republic of Germany; G.H.W. Bush, ‘A Europe whole and free’, remarks to the 
citizens in Mainz, 31 May 1989, <usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm>.
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there, the Alliance highlighted the ‘significant progress’86 that had been made 
in terms of transformation, but in the same breath conceded that ‘this is a 
process that must continue’.87 Especially, NATO members were ‘determined 
to improve the EU NATO strategic partnership’,88 stressing that ‘[a] stronger 
EU will further contribute to [their] common security’,89 an attitude which as 
we have seen is being vocally upheld by the new US administration. 
I would like to conclude by presenting a more European interpretation of 
the way towards establishing two equal pillars. While President Kennedy 
stressed that ‘[t]he first order of business is for our European friends to go 
forward in forming the more perfect union which will someday make this 
partnership possible’,90 it could also be argued that there is, through the very 
nature of European integration, no ultimate point in time where one could say: 
The European Pillar is now ready and complete. Maybe we should acquaint 
ourselves with the thought that there is no finalité in building the European 
pillar and indeed the transatlantic relationship as a whole. This realization 
can also draw on the convictions of the President Barack Obama, whose call 
for change became the hallmark of his campaign for the presidency. That 
this notion of change has to be understood more as a continuous effort for 
improvement than a one-time fix also regarding transatlantic relations was 
well-illustrated by his remarks in Berlin last summer: ‘true partnership and 
true progress requires constant work and sustained sacrifice.’91 Therefore, as 
with the concept of the ever-closer union, we should also contemplate the 
Atlantic Alliance as an ever-changing, yet ever-closer partnership, requiring 
constant improvement and adjustment to a rapidly changing world. In my 
view, the history of NATO and its transformation actually support such 
an approach.92 President Kennedy said that this partnership would ‘not be 
completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal’.93 Perhaps it will 
never be ultimately completed, but this certainly does not make it any less of 
a goal to strive for. 
 86 NATO, ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008’, press 
release (2008)049, 3 April 2008, <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>, para. 1.
 87 Ibid.
 88 Ibid., para. 14.
 89 Ibid.
 90 Kennedy, note 1 above.
 91 Obama, note 37 above.
 92 Also at the Bucharest Summit it was stressed that ‘[t]ransformation is a continual process 
and demands constant and active attention’, note 86 above, para. 45.
 93 Kennedy, note 1 above.
